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ABSTRACT

In general, document sanitization consists of two main tasks:
(1) Identifying personally identifiable information, e.g., as
defined by the HIPAA safe harbor rules, and (2) “hiding”
the discovered identifiers. Unfortunately, medically relevant
terms can often be identifying, for example conditions related to the disease (such as weight, which can assist in
identification.) To truly sanitize documents requires hiding
such relatively unique information, which likely goes beyond
obvious identifiers.
The first task has received much attention from the research community, and many commercial products have been
developed to detect personal identifiable attributes. As for
the second task, the main approach adopted by current text
sanitization techniques is to simply remove personal identifiers (names, dates, locations, diagnoses, etc.,) to prevent
re-identification of text documents. It is not hard to see
that if diagnoses and personal medical histories are completely removed from pathology records, these records are
no longer readable, and even worse, they no longer contain
sufficient information to allow biomedical researchers to develop treatments for fatal diseases. This can be illustrated
by the following example.
Suppose a phrase “Uses marijuana for pain” is contained
in a medical report. The traditional techniques can sanitize
this phrase by “blacking out” sensitive information, such as
the drug used or diagnosis, turn the phrase into the meaningless “uses
for
”. This can cause sanitized texts to
be no longer readable, and hence, document utility is unnecessarily degraded. More specifically, let d refer to the sample
text in Figure 1(a), where Sacramento, marijuana, lumbar pain and liver cancer are the sensitive terms. Let
d∗ refer to the sanitized text in Figure 1(b), which is the
result of removing sensitive words from d. Clearly, d∗ is
useless for analyzing disease epidemics. Let d† refer to the
sanitized text in Figure 1(c), where sensitive words are replaced by more general terms (using the hypernym trees
presented in Figure 2, where a word w in a given tree has a
broader meaning than its children). d† contains much more
information than d∗ . However, it still protects sensitive information (removing specific identifying information as well
as the sensitivity of the type of drug used) and preserves
linguistic structure.
Observe that the sensitive information “tuberculosis” can
be replaced with the less sensitive term “infectious disease”.
That is, instead of simply removing sensitive terms, these
terms can be hidden by more general but semantically related terms to protect sensitive information without unnecessarily degrading document utility (the amount of infor-

Text documents play significant roles in decision making and
scientific research. Under federal regulations, documents
(e.g., pathology records) containing personally identifiable
information cannot be shared freely, unless properly sanitized. Generally speaking, document sanitization consists
of finding and hiding personally identifiable information.
The first task has received much attention from the research
community, but the main strategy for the second task has
been to simply remove personal identifiers. It is not hard to
see that if important information (e.g., diagnoses and personal medical histories) is completely removed from pathology records, these records are no longer readable, and even
worse, they no longer contain sufficient information for research purposes.
Observe that the sensitive information “tuberculosis” can
be replaced with the less sensitive term “infectious disease”.
That is, instead of simply removing sensitive terms, these
terms can be hidden by more general but semantically related terms to protect sensitive information, without unnecessarily degrading the amount of information contained in
the document. Based on this observation, the main contribution of this paper is to provide a novel information theoretic approach to text sanitization, develop efficient heuristics to sanitize text documents, and analyze possible attacks
preventable under the proposed model.

1.

Chris Clifton3 ,

INTRODUCTION

Medical documents, such as pathology records, play significant roles in detecting, verifying and monitoring new diagnostic examinations and treatment methodologies. However, under federal regulations, e.g., the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [6], because
these records often contain sensitive or confidential information, they cannot be distributed freely. As a consequence,
they cannot be used for medical research, e.g., to discover
cures for life threatening diseases, unless properly sanitized.
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least k tuples in relational format. The proposed work here
focuses on sanitizing a single text-based document without assuming access to a collection of related documents.
Clearly the presence of multiple identical text documents
about different individuals is unlikely; and modifying similar documents so they are identical while still preserving
some semblance of semantics and readability requires a much
deeper understanding of documents than Natural Language
Processing is currently capable of. Therefore, applying kanonymity directly is not feasible.

mation). Based on this observation, the overall objectives
of this paper are: (1) provide an information theoretic approach to text sanitization, (2) develop efficient algorithms
to sanitize text documents based on the proposed information theoretic measure, and (3) analyze possible attacks that
the proposed text sanitization approach can prevent, from
the perspective of existing privacy protection models.
A Sacramento resident purchased marijuana
for the lumbar pain caused by liver cancer.

2.1 Text Anonymization

(a) Sample text

Much text anonymization work has mainly concentrated
on de-identification of medical documents. The Scrub system [14] finds and replaces patterns of identifying information such as name, location, Social Security Number, medical terms, age, date, etc. The replacement strategy is to
change the identified word to another word of similar type
(e.g., an identified name is replaced with a fake name), and it
is not clear whether the semantics of the reports themselves
reveal the individuals. Similarly, [16] provides a six-step
anonymization scheme that finds and replaces identifying
words with pseudonyms from patient records in Norwegian.
In [4], the authors present schemes for removing protected
health information (PHI) from free-text nursing notes. Since
the text in this case does not follow the syntax of natural language construction, it poses challenges in recognition of PHI.
The solution consists of techniques such as pattern matching, lexical matching, and heuristics to find the PHI from
nursing notes. Moving away from purely syntactic based
recognition of identifying information, MEDTAG [11], a specialized medical semantic lexicon, is used for finding personally identifying information in patient records. This system
uses the semantic tags for disambiguation of words, and also
relies on manually written disambiguation rules to differentiate between words that have different contextual meanings.
The identifiers are then removed from the medical records.
To our knowledge, there exists very little work that addresses the general problem of text sanitization. A twophase scheme that employs both sanitization and anonymization was proposed in [13]. The sanitization step uses automatic named entity extraction methods to tag the terms,
and then replaces them with dummy values. This is equivalent to replacing the selected terms with their corresponding categories. The anonymization phase is defined based
on k-anonymity and only applied on quasi-identifying words
(i.e., words presumed to be combinable with certain external knowledge to possibly identify an individual). In [1], an
ontological representation of text document is used to find
and remove sensitive sentences. The pre-defined contextual
restrictions act as the inputs, and also guide the sanitization procedure. This results in the sensitive sentences being removed from the document. Assuming the existence of
an external database containing demographic information,
suppression-based methods were introduced in [3] to sanitized documents such that the resulting documents cannot
be linked to less than k records in the external database.
To summarize, existing work mainly focuses on how to
identify sensitive words, and either remove them or replace
them with pseudonyms. The replacement strategies lack
a theoretic foundation, and consequently, without a formal
measurement, it is difficult to judge the quality of sanitized
documents. The work proposed here provides a theoretic

A Sacramento resident purchased marijuana
for the lumbar pain caused by liver cancer.
(b) Sanitized text
A state capital resident purchased drug
for the pain caused by carcinoma.
(c) Semantic preserving sanitized text
Figure 1: A sample text and its sanitized versions

1.1 Problem Overview
To avoid unnecessary distortion, our view of text document security is as follows: given a threshold t and the set
of word ontologies (e.g., hypernym trees), a sanitized text
should be a plausible result of at least t base text documents. From this point of view, we will develop information
theoretic measures and algorithms to sanitize text as shown
in Figure 1(c). We make the following assumptions: Given
a document and an (possibly domain specific) ontology, we
can identify a set of sensitive words related to the document
(e.g., using techniques developed in [1, 11, 14] or domain
specific knowledge). In our problem domain, since sensitive words are the focal point, without loss of generality, we
assume a piece of text d only contains sensitive values.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
summarizes relevant current work and points out the differences; Section 3 proposes an information theoretic measure
according to the concept of t-plausibility and analyzes the
hardness of t-plausibility based text sanitization problem;
Section 4 proposes uniform t-plausibility measure and effective and efficient text sanitization heuristics; Section 5 discusses how t-plausibility prevents possible attacks by comparing existing privacy protection models and issues regarding sanitization of large documents; Section 6 validates our
analyses via experimental results and Section 7 concludes
the paper with future research directions.

2.

RELATED WORK

The existing work most related to ours is data anonymization and text de-identification. The most common data
anonymization technique is k-anonymity proposed in [12,
15]. Since then, there has been extensive work done related
to anonymizing structured information, i.e., datasets of at
2

Seat (50)

Agent (10)

Evidence (20)

Malignant_tumor (7)

Capital (32)

Drug (6)

Symptom (10)

Cancer (5)

State_capital (4)

Denver, Indianapolis
Phoenix, Sacramento

Controlled_substance (2)

Pain (2)

Lumbar_pain
Migraine

Morphine
Marijuana

Carcinoma (2)

Liver_cancer
Lung_cancer

Figure 2: Word ontologies
measure on the quality of sanitized documents from a privacy protection point of view. These measures provide formal reasonings on how and why a more general term is chosen to replace sensitive information in a given document. In
addition to the given document, the only information available to us is related word ontologies, or hypernym trees; and
we do not use domain-specific information extraction techniques. We use WordNet [10] in our examples/experiments
to retrieve word ontologies and generate hypernym trees.

In most situations, a set is considered as an ordered set.
For instance o[i] is the ith ontology of the ith word in d
¯
(i.e., d[i]). Similarly, d[i] can only be generalized to d[i].
Figure 2 contains four word hypernym trees used extensively
hereafter. The base values (sensitive values from the original
text) are at the bottom of the ontologies. Values in the nonleaf nodes can be generalized to any values on its path to
the root. For example, given the first ontology in Figure 2,
Sacramento can be generalized to State capital, Capital and
so on. State capital can be generalized to Capital, Seat, etc.
The integer value, termed as volume, in the parentheses
indicates how many base values can be generalized to its
related value. For instance, the value 32 associated with
Capital (i.e., the volume of Capital) indicates that there are
thirty-two base values (including the four values shown at
leaves) that can be generalized to Capital. Note that the
ontologies shown here are not the complete ontology trees,
and some branches are omitted. The partial ontologies are
extracted form WordNet, but for practicality of illustration,
we do not use complete ontologies. Based on the previously
introduced notations, we define the following functions:
o
n
`
´
¯ o → wi1 , . . . , wki , the word domain func1. W w̄i , d, d,
i

3.

T -PLAUSIBILITY TEXT SANITIZATION
Before presenting the concept of t-plausibility sanitization
on text (t-PAT), we first introduce key notations and terminologies in Section 3.1. The formal definition of t-PAT is
presented in Section 3.2. Then we prove that t-PAT is NPhard in Section 3.3. At the end of this section, we present
a pruning-based algorithm to find the optimal solution according to the definition of t-PAT.

3.1 Basic Notations and Terminologies
For the remaining of this paper, the terms sanitization
(sanitized) and generalization (generalized) are interchangeable. The term “base text” refers a text that has not been
sanitized in any
text, d¯ `be a ´sanitized
` way.´ Let d be a base
¯
text and d[i] or d[i]
denote the ith term in d or d¯ (a term
is a word, or phrase recognized by the ontology; where we
use “word” it could also be such a short phrase.) Because we
merely consider sensitive words, most often, d represents the
set of sensitive words in the original text. For example, suppose the text in Figure 1(a) is the original text, then we have
d = [Sacramento, marijuana, lumbar pain, liver cancer].

tion (W (w̄i ) for short):

¯ and d ⊳ d¯ according to o.
• Pre-condition: w̄i = d[i]
o
n
• Post-condition: d[i] ∈ wi1 , . . . , wiki , wij ⊳ w̄i for
1 ≤ j ≤ ki and wi1 , . . . , wiki are base values in oi .1

Given a generalized word w̄i , it returns a set of all
possible words at the same level of d[i] that can be
generalized to w̄i according to o.
`
´
¯ o → P rob (wi′ ⊳ w̄i ), the local proba2. Po wi′ , w̄i , d, d,
bility function (Po (wi′ , w̄i ) for short):
`
´
¯o
• Pre-condition: wi′ ∈ W w̄i , d, d,

Definition 1 (Generalizable ⊳). We˛ say
˛ that d is gener¯ for
¯ if |d| = ˛d¯˛ and d[i] ⊳ d[i]
alizable to d¯ (denoted as d ⊳ d)
1 ≤ i ≤ m.

Since we only consider the base texts generalizable
to some
˛ ˛
sanitized text, we always assume that |d| = ˛d¯˛. Next, we
list additional notations adopted throughout the paper.

• Post-condition: The probability that given w̄i (or
d[i]), wi′ is the original word.

Given a word wi′ in the domain of w̄i , it returns the
probability that w̄i is generalized from wi′ .
`
´
˘ `
´
`
´¯
¯ o → W w̄1 , d, d,
¯ o × · · · × W w̄m , d, d,
¯o ,
3. D d, d,
¯ for short):
the text domain function (D(d)

• o = {o1 , . . . , om }: Word ontology set represented as a
set of word ontologies related to each word in d.
• d = {w1 , . . . , wm }: A base text represented as a set of
terms, where |d| = m, wi ∈ oi for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. wi is
equivalent to d[i].
• d¯ = {w̄1 , . . . , w̄m }: A˛ generalized
text represented as
˛
a set of terms, where ˛d¯˛ = m, w̄i ∈ oi and wi ⊳ w̄i . w̄i
¯
is equivalent to d[i].

• Pre-condition: d ⊳ d¯ according to o.
1
Base values are defined as the values from the based level
of the ontology, and base level is defined by that of wi in oi .

3

• Post-condition:
d´˛∈ D,
Q D = {d1 , d2 ,˛. . . ,`dk } and
¯ o ˛.
˛W w̄i , d, d,
where k = m
k
and
k
=
i
i
i=1

According to Definition 3, the t-PAT problem is to find
¯ o)|, is equal to t or
a sanitization d¯ of d, such that |D(d, d,
the least upper bound of t. We next show that this text
sanitization problem is NP-hard.

Given a text d, its generalized counterpart d¯ and a
set of word ontologies, the function returns a set of all
possible texts that can be generalized to d¯ according
to o. We call such set as the domain of d.
`
´
`
´
¯ o → P rob d′ ⊳ d¯ , the global plausibility
4. P d′ , d, d,
¯ for short):
function (P (d′ , d)
`
´
¯o
• Pre-condition: d′ ∈ D d, d,
• Post-condition: The probability that d is generalized from d′ .

3.3 Hardness of t-PAT
Theorem 1. t-PAT defined in Definition 3 is NP-Hard.
Proof. The reduction is from the subset product problem,
which is defined as follows: Given a set of integers I and a
positive integer p, is there any non-empty subset I ′ ⊆ I such
that the product of numbers in I ′ equals p? This problem
is proven to be NP-Complete [5]. We now show a reduction
from the subset product problem to t-PAT. Assume that
there exists an algorithm A that solves t-PAT in polynomial
time. For each wi (1 ≤ i ≤ m), define a set Mi containing
the volumes of the terms along the path from wi to w̄i , where
w̄i ∈ oi and wi ⊳ w̄i . The number of possible w̄i is limited by
the depth of the ontology. For example, refer to Figure 2, let
wi be the word Sacramento and w̄i be the word capital, then
Mi = {1, 4, 8}. The input to A are the sets M1 , . . . , Mm and
the plausibility parameter t. The solution of t-PATQ
is a set
of m numbers {n1 , . . . , nm } such that ni ∈ Mi , and m
i=1 ni
is equal to the least upper bound of t.
The subset product problem can be solved using A as follows. The input to the subset product problem is the set of
integers I = {a1 , . . . , am } and the product p. Construct m
sets by creating Mi = {ai , 1} for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and invoke A
with inputs M1 , . . . , MQ
m and p. A returns a set of m numbers {n1 , . . . , nm }. If m
i=1 ni = p, the subset product has
an answer. This can be obtained by looking at {n1 , . . . , nm }
returned by A. If ni = 1, ai is not included in the subset.
On the other hand,
Q if ni = ai , the subset contains the element ai . Suppose m
i=1 ni > p, then there does not exist any
subset in I such that the product of the subset is p. Otherwise, A would have returned such a subset. Since the input
and output transformations can be performed in polynomial
time, we can conclude that t-PAT is NP-hard.

Given a text d′ in the domain of d, the function returns
¯ That
the probability that d′ can be generalized to d.
is, P returns the probability that d′ is the original text.
Example 1. Refer to Figure 2, if w̄i = controlled substance,
then W (w̄i ) returns {Ecstasy, Marijuana}. Assuming uniform distribution in W (w̄i ) and wi′ = marijuana, Po (wi′ , w̄i ) =
1
= 12 . Let d = {marijuana, lumbar pain} and d¯ =
|W (w̄i )|
¯ o) returns d1 =
{controlled substance, pain}, then D(d, d,
{marijuana, lumbar pain}, d2 = {marijuana, migraine}, d3 =
{ecstasy, lumbar pain} and d4 = {ecstasy, migraine}. If we
assume uniform distribution in both W (d̄[1]) and W (d̄[2]),
¯ = 1.
for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, P (di , d)
2
4

3.2 Plausibility Sanitization on Text
Based on the previously introduced notations and terminologies, here we formally define our text sanitization problem. Define the sanitization function f as
f : d, t, o → d¯
which takes a text d, security parameter or threshold t and a
¯ The security
set of ontologies o as the input and outputs d.
parameter basically restricts the set of possible outputs and
is defined as follows:
Definition 2 (t-Plausibility). d¯ is t-plausible if at least t
base texts (including d) can be generalized to d¯ based on o.

3.4 Exhaustive Search with Pruning Strategy

This definition simply says that a sanitized text d¯ can
be associated with at least t texts, and any one of them
could be the original text d. For instance, Let d¯ be the
text in Figure 1(c). Based on the word ontologies in Figure
¯ = 96, and we say that d¯ can be associated with
2, |D(d)|
96 texts. If t ≤ 96, d¯ satisfies the t-plausibility condition.
When a text is sanitized properly, we should not be able
to uniquely identify the original text. To prevent unique
identification, there should exist more than one text that
could be the base text. These texts are called plausible texts.
The parameter t is defined as a lower bound on the number
of plausible texts related to a given generalized text. t can
also be considered as the degree of privacy that a sanitized
text needs to guarantee.
Based on t, we define the text sanitization problem as an
optimization problem. Since our intuition relies on the concept of t-plausibility, we term the text sanitization problem
as t-Plausibility Sanitization on Text (t-PAT).

To solve t-PAT, we can simply enumerates all possible
solutions and picks the best one. This can be easily accomplished by a recursive formulation. However, the exhaustive
search is inefficient and intractable for large values of m.
We present a pruning strategy that limits the search space
to improve search efficiency. ESearch Prune (Algorithm 1)
is a recursive procedure to generate combinations of generalizations of a set of words d = {w1 , . . . , wm } with the given
ontology o = {o1 , . . . , om }. The procedure takes a set d¯
(current generalization up to ith word), the index i, the best
value for t-PAT found so far as tc and its corresponding generalization d¯c . When i < m, d¯ is a partial generalization on
¯ > tc then any superset d¯′ of d¯ will be such that
d. If |D(d)|
′
¯
|D(d )| > tc . This observation guides the pruning process.
At step 2 of algorithm 1, hi denotes the height of the
hypernym tree oi of word wi , and w̄i+j indicates the j th
generalization (or hypernym) of wi on oi in ascending order
from wi to the root of the tree. wi = w̄i+0 is a special case.
If i < m, for each generalization of wi from w̄i+j to w̄i+hi ,
ESearch Prune is called again with i + 1. Note that w̄i+j is
+(j+1)
selected in an ascending order such that w̄i+j ⊳ w̄i
. The
recursion terminates when i equals m. When this occurs,

Definition 3 (t-PAT). Let t be a threshold, o be a set of
word ontologies and d be a base text. The t-PAT problem
¯ such that d¯ is t-plausible and
is to find a sanitized text d,
¯ o)| is minimal.
|D(d, d,
4

¯
¯ is less
the set d¯ is used to calculate |D(d)|.
If this |D(d)|
¯
than tc , but greater than or equal to t then d¯ and |D(d)|
¯
are returned as the best solutions. Otherwise, tc and dc are
returned. Algorithm 1 lists the steps of a pruning based recursive procedure. It is invoked as ESearch Prune(∅, 1, ∞, ∅)
and the returned values are the solutions to t-PAT.

4.1 Uniform t-Plausibility and an Information
Theoretic Measure
Uniform plausibility implies that each sensitive word need
to be protected unbiasedly. Under this uniform plausibility requirement, we can avoid situations where some words
are generalized too much and other words are not generalized at all. To materialize uniform plausibility, we utilize
the expected uncertainty of individual sensitive words as a
measure. We use entropy to model this uncertainty and to
accomplish uniform plausibility. Details are given next.
Let m be the number of words that need to be generalized
in d, H be an entropy function and α be a system parameter governing the tradeoff between global optimality and
uniform generalization. For 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, the cost function
¯ t) is defined as:
C(d,
«2
m „
X
´
log t
α `
¯ − log t 2 + 1 − α
(1)
H(
d)
H(
w̄
)
−
i
m2
m i=1
m

¯ i, tc , d¯c ) - The Exhaustive
Algorithm 1 ESearch Prune(d,
Search with Pruning for t-PAT
Require: d¯ a set containing i generalized words, i an index,
tc the current least upper bound on t, d¯c a generalization
of d whose |D(d¯c )| = tc and d, o, t are implicit parameters
1: if i < m then
2:
for j = 0 to hi do
3:
if |D(d¯ ∪ {w̄i+j })| > tc then
4:
return (tc , d¯c )
5:
end if
6:
(tc , d¯c ) ← ESearch Prune(d¯ ∪ {w̄i+j }, i + 1, tc , d¯c )
7:
if tc = t then
8:
return (tc , d¯c )
9:
end if
10:
end for
11: else
¯ < tc then
12:
if t ≤ |D(d)|
¯ d)
¯
13:
return (|D(d)|,
14:
end if
15: end if
16: return (tc , d¯c )

The intuition behind is that the first term defines a global
measure: how close the generalized text d¯ is to the expected
uncertainty defined by t. The second term defines a local measure to achieve the uniform uncertainty (leading to
t
uniform plausibility) among all sensitive words. log
is the
m
expected entropy of each sensitive word when the text is
properly generalized. Intuitively, the lower C, the better
each sensitive word is protected. Note that the denominators m2 and m are used as scaling factors so that the two
terms are relatively at the same scale. Detailed discussion
on this issue is presented in Section 4.5.
¯
Next we show how to calculate the entropies of w̄i and d.
H(w̄i ) can be calculate as:

4.

T -PAT REVISITED
The optimal solution to the t-PAT problem defined in Definition 3 may not be the best solution in practice because it
does not consider privacy protection of individual sensitive
words. It is possible that an optimal solution comes from
heavily generalizing only a few sensitive words. This can be
illustrated by the following example.

H(w̄i ) = −

ki
X

Po (wij , w̄i ) log Po (wij , w̄i )

(2)

j=1

where ki = |W (w̄i )| is the number of words that can be
generalized to w̄i . W is the word domain function and Po
is the local plausibility function. Both functions are defined
¯ can be calculated as follows:
in Section 3.1. Similarly, H(d)

Example 2. Refer to Figure 1 and Figure 2. Let d be
the text in Figure 1(b). Suppose t = 32, then the optimal
solution d¯ based on Definition 3 is:

¯ =−
H(d)

A capital resident purchased marijuana
for the lumbar pain caused by liver cancer.

k
X

¯ log P (di , d)
¯
P (di , d)

(3)

i=1

¯ D is the text domain function and P is
where k = |D(d)|.
the global plausibility function. Both functions are defined
in Section 3.1. If we assume that each word is independent.
¯ can be calculated as follows:
P (di , d)

The volume of capital is 32 (there are 32 base values generalizable to capital.) This implies that there are 32 possible
¯ However, from a privacy pretexts can be associated to d.
serving point of view, this d¯ does not protect privacy as well
as the following generalized text:

¯ =
P (di , d)

A state capital resident purchased drug
for the pain caused by carcinoma.

m
Y

¯
Po (di [j], d[j])

(4)

j=1

Example 3. Let w̄i be the state capital in Figure 2, and
assume uniform
P distribution in W (w̄i ). We can compute
H(w̄i ) = − 4j=1 14 log 14 = 2. Let d¯ be the sanitized text
in Figure 1(c) (i.e., d¯ = {state capital, drug, pain, carcinoma}). Let d be the original text in Figure 1(b) (i.e.,
d = {Sacramento, marijuana, lumbar pain, liver cancer}).
Assume uniform distribution in each w̄i (or d[i]). Then
` ´
¯ = 1 · 1 3 = 1 , and since P (di , d)
¯ = 1 for
P (di , d)
4
2
32
P3232 1
1
¯
1 ≤ i ≤ 32, H(d) = − i=1 32 log 32 = 5.
Let α = 0.5 and t = 32. If d¯ = {capital, marijuana,

A solution is to require that every sensitive word be protected equally. If most of the sensitive words are not generalized, then d¯ contains too much sensitive information. 2
As shown in the example, in practice, not only do we
need to measure the quality of a generalized text d¯ using the
threshold t, but also we need to consider how d¯ can preserve
the privacy of every sensitive word. To achieve this goal, we
next present an information theoretic measure based on the
uniform plausibility assumption - every sensitive word needs
to be protected equally.
5

Observation 1 (Monotonicity property of C2 ). Given
d¯ ⊂ d¯′ , we have the following condition on the the second
¯ t).
term of the cost metric: C2 (d¯′ , t) ≥ C2 (d,
`
´
¯ t) + δ. Since H(w̄i ) − log t 2
Proof. Write C2 (d¯′ , t) = C2 (d,
m
cannot be negative, we have δ ≥ 0. This implies that
¯ t).
C2 (d¯′ , t) ≥ C2 (d,

lumbar pain, liver cancer},
¯ t) =
C(d,
=

«2
4 „
5
1X
H(w̄i ) −
8 i=1
4
„ «2
„
«2
5
3
1 15
−
+
≈ 2.33
8 4
8
4

Nevertheless, if d¯′ = {state capital, drug, pain, carcinoma},
«2
4 „
5
1X
H(w̄i ) −
C(d¯′ , t) =
8 i=1
4
„ «2
„
«2
1
3
1 3
−
+
≈ 0.09
=
8 4
8
4

This observation can be used to stop considering the su¯ t) is greater
persets of a partial anonymization d¯ when C2 (d,
or equal to the minimum cost (tc ) found so far. Given that
¯ ≥ tc then the cost of a complete genC1 (S̄, t) ≥ 0, if C2 (d)
eralization consisting of d¯ must exceed tc .
Observation 2 (Monotonic property of Cost metric).
¯ ≥ log t, then the cost function C(d¯′ , t) ≥ C(d,
¯ t).
If H(d)

¯ t). This
Clearly, C(d¯′ , t) is a much smaller cost than C(d,
matches the intuition behind Equation 1 and implies that d¯′
is a better sanitized text than d¯ from a privacy protection
perspective. Indeed, we can observe that d¯′ achieves uniform
¯
plausibility better than d.
2

Proof. This basically says that the cost metric of a superset
¯ is greater than or equal to the cost
(d¯′ ) of a generalization (d)
¯ ≥ log t. We establish this
metric of its subset d¯ when H(d)
by considering the first and second terms of C individually.
• The first term of the cost metric for d¯ is defined as
C1 = (H(d̄) − log t)2 (ignoring the coefficient). Since
¯ ≥ log t and H(d¯′ ) ≥ H(d̄), we have C1 (d¯′ , t) ≥
H(d)
¯ t).
C1 (d,

As mentioned before, the optimal solutions presented in
Section 3.4 do not take into account the concept of uniform
plausibility. In other words, if d¯ is optimal according to Definition 3, not all words in d are equally protected. This was
shown in Example 2. Whether or not uniform plausibility
is achievable depends on the structure of hypernym trees.
At least by minimizing C, we can achieve some degree of
uniform plausibility. Our objective here is defined by the
following definition:

¯ t).
• From Observation 1, we know that C2 (d¯′ , t) ≥ C2 (d,
Given the above properties of individual terms, it is clear
¯ t).
that C(d¯′ , t) ≥ C(d,
This observation is used to stop considering the supersets
¯ t) is greater than the
of a partial anonymization d¯ when C(d,
current minimum cost tc (given H(d̄) ≥ log t).
The pruning strategies avoid generating combinations clearly
worse than the best solution. Algorithm 2 lists the steps
of a pruning based recursive procedure. This procedure is
invoked as Uniform ESearch Prune(∅, 1, ∞, ∅) and the returned values minimize the cost function C. The pruning
condition at steps 3-5 is based on Observation 2, and the
pruning condition at steps 7-9 is based on Observation 1.
The notation hi and w̄i+j introduced in Section 3.4 indicate
the height of oi and the j th generalization of wi .

Definition 4 (Uniform t-PAT). Given a text d, a set of
hypernym trees o (related to d), alpha value and a thresh¯ ≥ log t and C(d,
¯ t) is
old t, find a d¯ of d, such that H(d)
minimized.

4.2 Search for Minimizing C(d,¯ t) with Pruning
The exhaustive search approach enumerates all the possible solutions and picks the generalization d¯ that minimizes
¯ ≥ log t.
the cost metric C under the condition that H(d)
We now present a pruning strategy that improves the efficiency of pure exhaustive search. Key steps are provided in
Algorithm 2. Similar to Algorithm 1, the recursive procedure builds all possible combinations of generalizations of
the words d = {w1 , . . . , wm } based on the set of hypernym
trees o = {o1 , . . . , om }. The procedure takes a set d¯ (current
generalization up to ith word), the index i, the current minimum cost tc and the generalization d¯c whose cost is equal
to tc . The end of recursion is reached when i equals m.
¯ t) of such generalization, as
When this occurs, the cost C(d,
¯ is computed. This cost is compared against
defined by d,
the current minimum cost (tc ), and if the new cost is lower
¯ ≥ log t, the current generalization d¯ and
than tc and H(d)
its cost are returned.
When i < m, we apply the pruning criteria to decide
whether further generalization would give us a better solution with a cost less than tc . Let us assume that the cost
metric (Equation 1) is represented as C = C1 + C2 , where C1
and C2 are the global and local measures respectively. Let d¯
¯ < m.
be a partial anonymization on d. This implies that |d|
¯ by the Equation 3.
The entropy of d¯ is calculated as H(d)
¯ Thus
Let d¯′ be a generalization and also be a superset of d.
¯ < |d¯′ | ≤ m and H(d¯′ ) ≥ H(d).
¯ We
we have d¯ ⊂ d¯′ , |d|
observe the following properties on the cost function.

4.3 Proposed Heuristics
Exhaustive search based algorithms are not practical in
the average case. Thus, in this section, we propose three
heuristics to generate sanitized texts that possess the property of uniform plausibility. Although the proposed heuristics are simple, they are intuitive, and most importantly,
we also provide an upper bound on the worst case scenario
according to the cost function C. Since to use the cost function C, we need to know the Po (wi′ , w̄i ) value for each wi′ in
W (w̄i ), for the rest of this section, we assume that words
are uniformly distributed in each W (w̄i ).2 Let w̄i− and w̄i+
be the immediate hyponym and hypernym of w̄i on the hyponym tree respectively.
LUB Search (Algorithm 3) consists of two main steps:
finding an upper bound on C, and performing greedy search
to improve the upper bound cost. Steps 1-3 of Algorithm
3 find a generalized text d¯ such that the optimal cost is
¯ t). Steps 5-7 check the
always less than or equal to C(d,
2
In later sections, we will propose a way to assign nonuniform probability for each word in W (w̄i ).
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¯ i, tc , d¯c ) - Search
Algorithm 2 Uniform ESearch Prune(d,
for minimizing C with Pruning
Require: d¯ a partial generalization on d containing i words,
i an index, tc current minimum cost, d¯c a partial generalization whose cost is tc and d, t, o implicit parameters
1: if i < m then
¯ t) ≥ log t then
2:
if H(d,
¯ t) > tc then
3:
if C(d,
4:
return (tc , d¯c )
5:
end if
6:
end if
¯ t) > tc then
7:
if C2 (d,
8:
return (tc , d¯c )
9:
end if
10:
for j = 0 to hi do
11:
(tc ,d¯c ) ← Uniform ESearch Prune(d¯ ∪ w̄i+j , i +
1, tc , d¯c )
12:
end for
13: else
¯ t) < tc and H(d,
¯ t) ≥ log t then
14:
if C(d,
¯
¯
15:
return (C(d, t), d)
16:
end if
17: end if
18: return (tc , d¯c )

¯ tc , d¯c )
Algorithm 4 MStep Greedy Search (δ, d,
Require: δ a limit on the maximum number of deviations
¯ d¯ a text or a generalized text in the form
allowed on d,
of {w̄1 , . . . , w̄m }, tc indicating the best current value of
C, and d¯c the generalized text whose cost is tc
¯ do
1: for i = 1 to |d|
2:
d¯′ ← d¯−i ∪ {w̄i+ }
3:
if C(d¯′ , t) < tc and H(d̄′ ) > log t then
4:
tc ← C(d¯′ , t)
5:
d¯c ← d¯′
6:
end if
7:
d¯′ ← d¯−i ∪ {w̄i− }
8:
if C(d¯′ , t) < tc and H(d̄′ ) > log t then
9:
tc ← C(d¯′ , t)
10:
d¯c ← d¯′
11:
end if
12: end for
13: if δ = 1 then
14:
return (tc , d¯c )
15: end if
¯ do
16: for i = 1 to |d|
17:
(tc , d¯c ) ← MStep Greedy Search (δ − 1, d¯−i ∪
{w̄i+ }, tc , d¯c )
18:
(tc , d¯c ) ← MStep Greedy Search (δ − 1, d¯−i ∪
{w̄i− }, tc , d¯c )
19: end for
20: return (tc , d¯c )

Algorithm 3 LUB Search(d, t, o, δ) - The Least Upper
Bound Search for uniform t-PAT
Require: A base document d, a threshold t, a set of hypernym trees o and δ a greedy search threshold that limits
the maximum number of deviations allowed
1: for all wi ∈ d do
˚ tˇ
2:
Find a w̄i and H(w̄i ) = log
m
3: end for
¯ t)
4: c ← C(d,
5: if c = 0 ∨ δ = 0 then
6:
return d¯
7: end if
¯ ← MStep Greedy Search (δ, d,
¯ c, d)
¯
8: (c, d)
9: return d¯

can generate two new generalized texts by simply changing
¯
one of w̄i (or d[i])
values to w̄i+ or w̄i− . Let d¯−i denote
d¯ − {w̄i }; that is,
d¯−i = {w̄1 , . . . , w̄i−1 , w̄i+1 , . . . , w̄m }
Both d¯−i ∪ {w̄i+ } and d¯−i ∪ {w̄i− } are one-step deviations of
¯ Base on the above description, when δ = 1, the greedy
d.
strategy MStep Greedy Search generates 2m deviations of
¯ and returns the best one.
d,
On the other hand, when δ = 2, the MStep Greedy Search
algorithm exhaustively checks all possible two-step devia¯ and returns the one with the lowest cost. Simtions d¯c of d,
ilar to the one-step deviation, through two-step deviation
we can generate a new generalized text from d¯ by making
at most two changes. For instance, we can generalize or degeneralize3 w̄i twice, or we can generalize or de-generalize
w̄i and w̄j once each. The outcome of two-step deviation
include those of one-step deviation. For the case of δ = 2,
MStep Greedy Search generates 2m2 candidates. In general, MStep Greedy Search generates
!
δ
X
m
δ
2 •
, for 1 ≤ δ ≤ m
δ
j=1

¯ t) = 0. If the condition holds, we know that
condition C(d,
d¯ is the best possible solution, and no further computation
is needed. The condition δ = 0 (δ is the maximum number of deviations allowed in greedy search) indicates that no
greedy search is be performed and the current d¯ is returned.
If neither condition holds, the algorithm will continue to the
greedy search phase. The procedure MStep Greedy Search
at step 8 of Algorithm 3 returns a generalized text that is
either the same as d¯ or a better generalized document according to Equation 1.
The key steps of MStep Greedy Search are provided in
Algorithm 4. In this procedure, the search space is constrained around the generalized text d¯ with the number of
steps confined by the parameter δ. Our intuition is that the
optimal solution is not far from d¯ (computed at steps 1-3).
For instance, if δ = 1, MStep Greedy Search exhaustively
¯ and returns
checks all possible one-step deviations d¯c of d,
the one with the lowest cost and at the same time the cont
must hold. Let w̄i+ and w̄i− be the
dition H(d¯c ) ≥ log
m
immediate hypernym and hyponym of w̄i on the hypernym
tree oi respectively. One-step deviation on d¯ means that we

¯ The parameter δ determines the additional
deviations of d.
¯ The size
cost for finding possibly a better solution than d.
of δ is determined by the user.
Steps 1-12 of MStep Greedy Search check all one-step deviations of d¯ and returns the best one if δ = 1. When δ > 1,
steps 16-19 will be executed to generate deviations of more
than one steps. For succinctness, some steps are omitted
3
generalize means moving up in the hypernym tree and degeneralize means moving down in the hypernym tree
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¯ d, t)
Algorithm 5 One Step Alternative Search(d,
¯
Require: d a generalized text related to d and t is the privacy threshold
¯
1: m ← |d|
¯ t)
2: tc ← C(d,
3: for i = 1 to m do
4:
for j = 1 to m do
5:
d¯′ ← d¯−j ∪ {w̄i+ }
6:
if C(d¯′ , t) < tc and H(d̄′ ) > log t then
7:
tc ← C(d¯′ , t)
8:
d¯c ← d¯′
9:
end if
10:
d¯′ ← d¯−j ∪ {w̄i− }
11:
if C(d¯′ , t) < tc and H(d̄′ ) > log t then
12:
tc ← C(d¯′ , t)
13:
d¯c ← d¯′
14:
end if
15:
end for
16:
d¯ = d¯c
17: end for
18: return (tc , d¯c )

Let ki = |W (w̄i )|, and H(w̄i ) can be rewritten as follows:
H(w̄i )

= −

ki
X

Po (wij , w̄i ) log Po (wij , w̄i )

j=1

= −

ki
X
j=1

= − log

1
1
log
|W (w̄i )|
|W (w̄i )|
1
= log |W (w̄i )|
|W (w̄i )|

Lemma 2. If words in W (w̄i , o) are uniformly
distributed
¯ = Pm H(w̄i ).
and d¯ = LU B Search(d, t, o), then H(d)
i=1

Proof. Assuming uniform distribution in W (w̄i ) and from
¯ as P (di , d)
¯ =
previous
analysis, we Q
can rewrite P (di , d)
Qm
m
1
.
Let
k
=
k
,
and
H(
d̄)
is
computed
as:
j=1 |W (w̄j )|
i=1 i
¯ =
H(d)

−

k
X

¯ log P (di , d)
¯
P (di , d)

i=1

=

−

k
X
i=1

before the recursive calls. For instance, we need to check if
w̄i is on top or on the bottom of the hypernym tree, and
hypernym trees also need to be modified. We address these
issues in the implementation.
When δ is small, one disadvantage of MStep Greedy Search
is that many possible close deviations of d¯ are not searched.
Since the optimal solution is expected to be very close to
the upper bound in space, we introduce another heuristic, One Step Alternative Search, that searches for the best
¯ This heuristic can replace the
solution closely around d.
MStep Greedy Search strategy directly in Algorithm 3. Main
steps of One Step Alternative Search are given in Algorithm
5. During each iteration (the outer for-loop), 2m possible
one-step derivations from d¯ are generated, and the one with
the best cost is chosen to replace d¯ before next iteration.
The two greedy search strategies are interchangeable in
the LUB Search. Regardless of which strategy is adopted,
the LUB Search algorithm always guarantees the following:

=

(

− Qm

j=1

=

− log

m
Y

j=1

=

log

m
Y

j=1
m
Y

1
|W (w̄j )|

!)

k
1
log
|W
(
w̄j )|
|W (w̄j )|
j=1

m
Y

j=1
m
X

1
|W (w̄j )|

m
X
1
1
=−
log
|W (w̄j )|
|W
(
w̄j )|
j=1

log |W (w̄j )| =

j=1

m
X

H(w̄j )

j=1

Now, we can prove Theorem 2 using Lemma 1 and Lemma
¯ ≥ log t and then we
2. First we prove the condition H(d)
¯ t) − C ≤ σ 2 .
prove the second condition C(d,
Theorem 2. Refer to Algorithm 3. Steps 11-17 attempt to
find a generalized text that has lower cost than d¯ (computed
at steps 1-3). In the worst case scenario, assume the d¯ is
returned from LUB Search(d, t, o). Then we have that for
t
t
any 1 ≤ i ≤ m, H(w̄i ) ≥ log
. This implies H(w̄i ) − log
≥
m
m
0. Then the following inequality holds:
«
m „
X
log t
≥ 0
H(w̄i ) −
m
i=1

Theorem 2 (Upper Bound on the LUB Search algorithm). Suppose that d¯ = LUB Search(d, t, o). Then
¯ ≥ log t and C(d,
¯ t) − C ∗ ≤ σ 2 , where C ∗ is any minimal
H(d)
attainable cost according to Equation 1 and σ is a limiting
factor on the size of hypernym tree.

m
X
i=1

Before proving Theorem 2, we need the following lemmas
¯
about the entropy of w̄i and the entropy of d.

H(w̄i ) −

m
X
log t
m
i=1

m
X

≥

H(w̄i ) ≥

0
log t

i=1

Lemma 1. If words in W (w̄i ) are uniformly distributed,
then H(w̄i ) = log |W (w̄i )|.

¯ = Pm H(w̄i ). Therefore,
According to Lemma 2, H(d)
i=1
∗
¯
H(d) ≥ log t. Now let C be a minimal attainable cost according to Equation 1. Because we want to derive an up¯ t), let C ∗ (d¯∗ , t) = 0 and H(w̄i ) > log t .
per bound on C(d,
m
∗ ¯∗
C (d , t) can be written as:
«2
m „
X
´
log t
α `
∗
¯∗ ) − log t 2 + 1 − α
H(
w̄
)
−
H(
d
(5)
i
m2
m i=1
m

Proof. Since we assume words in W (w̄i ) are uniformly distributed, for any word wij ∈ W (w̄i ), Po (wij , w̄i ) = |W (1w̄i )| .
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1
m

Let assume the number of words that can be generalized to
w̄i grows exponentially with base 2σ as the height of the
hypernym tree. (σ is the limiting factor and in practice,
σ = 3 is sufficient.) For instance, assuming w̄i is at level
h of the hypernym tree oi , then the size of W (w̄i ) is about
2σh . On the other hand, if w̄i′ is at level h + 1 of oi , then
the size of W (w̄i′ ) is about 2σ(h+1) . Again if we assume
uniform distribution in both W (w̄i ) and W (w̄i′ ), H(w̄i′ ) =
H(w̄i ) + σ. Because each w̄i in d¯ is at most one level above
w̄i∗ in d¯∗ , H(w̄i ) = H(w̄i∗ ) + σ in the worst case. Based on
¯ t) can
Lemma 2 and Equation 1, the first component of C(d,
be calculated as follows:
!2
m
X
´
α `
¯ − log t 2 = α
H(
d)
H(
w̄
)
−
log
t
i
m2
m2 i=1
!2
m
α X
∗
(H(w̄i ) + σ) − log t
=
m2 i=1
!2
m
α X
∗
=
H(w̄i ) − log t + mσ
m2 i=1
α
• m2 σ 2 = ασ 2
=
m2

H(w̄i ), the first term can be written as:
„
«2
´2
α 2
log t
α `
¯
H(d) − log t
=
m H(w̄) −
m2
m2
m
«2
„
log t
= α H(w̄) −
m
i=1

´
`
´
Pm `
log t 2
t 2
Suppose
≈ m · H(w̄∗ ) − log
for
i=1 H(w̄i ) − m
m
some value H(w̄∗ ), then the second term of Equation 1 can
be written as:
«2
«2
„
m „
log t
log t
1−α X
H(w̄i ) −
= (1 − α) H(w̄∗ ) −
m i=1
m
m
As shown in the above analyses, by using m2 and m as
the normalizing factors, the first and the second terms of
Equation 1 have comparable scales or value ranges. As a
result, it is reasonable to use α as a single parameter to
adjust the significance of the two terms in the cost function.

5. PRIVACY PROTECTION AND OTHER
PRACTICAL ISSUES
From a privacy protection point of view, how is t-plausibility
different from other text sanitization and data anonymization techniques against possible attacks?

¯ t) can be calculated
Similarly, the second component of C(d,
as follows:
«2
m „
1−α X
log t
1−α
H(w̄i∗ ) −
+σ
• mσ 2
=
m i=1
m
m
=

Pm

5.1 Text Sanitization
Since the t-PAT is designed to sanitize text in general, it
can be adopted in any text or document sanitization process. As emphasized before, instead of removing sensitive
words or replacing sensitive words with synonyms, t-PAT
generalizes the sensitive words with a well-defined information theoretic measure. If no domain specific word ontologies
or hypernym trees are available, WordNet can be adopted.
More specifically, we show how to use t-PAT to solve the
problem presented in [3], where the privacy protection constraint is that sanitized documents cannot be linked to fewer
than k records in an external database.
The ERASE protocol proposed in [3] assumes that the
external database stores demographic information and each
record (in relational format) is associated with an individual.
A record r is associated with a given document d (a medical
report) if they have common words. ERASE sanitizes d by
removing some common words according to certain rules to
achieve the aforementioned privacy constraint. Without loss
of generality, assume medical report d is associated with one
patient. t-PAT can achieve the same privacy constraint as
follows: first build hypernym trees for each attribute of the
external database. Secondly, the sensitive words in d can be
identified as the set of common words between d and some
record r in the external database. By setting t = k in t-PAT,
we can generalize or sanitize d using the hypernym trees.
According to the definition of t-plausibility, the resulting
document clearly satisfies the privacy constraint.

(1 − α)σ 2

¯ t) − C ∗ = ασ 2 + (1 − α)σ 2 = σ 2 . Since we
Therefore, C(d,
∗
assume C = 0 and 0 is the best attainable minimal cost, for
¯ t)−C ∗ ≤ σ 2 holds.
any minimal cost C ∗ , the equality C(d,

4.4 Complexity Analysis of LUB Search
Since LUB Search consists of two phases, we analyze the
complexity of each phase independently. Assume the height
of every hypernym tree is bounded by h. The main cost
of the first phase (steps 1-3 of Algorithm 3) is to find the
upper bound. The upper bound for each word can be found
in log h steps, so the complexity of the first phase is bounded
by O(m log h).
The complexity of the second phase is determined by either MStep Greedy Search or One Step Alternative Search.
As analyzed in Section 4.3, MStep Greedy Search’s complexity is bounded by O(mδ ). Therefore, complexity of
LUB Search is O(m log h+mδ ). In practice, the height of hypernym trees is constant, and the complexity of LUB Search
can be rewritten as O(m + mδ ). Due to the fact that the
complexity of One Step Alternative Search is O(m2 ), the
complexity of LUB Search is bounded by O(m2 ) if we use
One Step Alternative Search as the greedy strategy.

4.5 The Cost Function C Revisited

5.2

k-Anonymity
k-anonymity was proposed in [12, 15] to sanitize structured data. As stated in Section 2, existing k-anonymization
techniques do not fit well with our problem domain, as the
diversity in text (even short segments of text) is such that
the likelihood that k text fragments belonging to different individuals would be semantically similar and grammatically

In Equation 1, α determines the importance each term
plays in evaluating the cost. Thus, the two terms should
have similar scales or ranges; otherwise, it is hard to choose
a suitable value for α. Having this in mind, we normalize the
first term with m2 . This makes sense, especially when words
are uniformly distributed
P in each W (w̄i ). Under uniformity
assumption, H(d̄) = m
i=1 H(w̄i ) (Lemma 2). Let H(w̄) =
9

For the accuracy evaluation, we measure the difference in
generalization that is found by the exhaustive search and the
one found by the heuristic searchers. For the running time
evaluation, we measure the gain by pruning-based search
and heuristic search schemes over the exhaustive search.

equivalent is low. Either semantics would be lost, or the
solution would require a full parsing and understanding of
semantics so as to generate an common anonymized text
that corresponds semantically to the k (possibly grammatically diverse) texts. However, t-PAT can be adopted to
anonymize structured data and the resulting data still preserves the spirit of the privacy protection guaranteed by kanonymity. Next we provide detailed analysis from an information theoretic perspective, and assume k-anonymization
is achieved via generalization.
Let X denote a dataset, Y denote the k-anonymous dataset
computed from X, and x ⊳ y denote that x ∈ X is directly
generalized to y ∈ Y In general, k-anonymity can be generalized to the following theorem [8]:

6.1 Data Description
For the purpose of experiments, a collection of 50 words
were selected randomly from the Wordnet tree hierarchy.
The chosen words are the leaf nodes falling under the “entity” tree node where there are 30,000 possible words. These
words were selected such that the height of individual word
hypernym tree is close (±1) to 8 (the average height of hypernym tree under “entity”). The words were subjected to
only this height constraint. Wordnet tree structures are kept
for all the selected words. If a word is generalizable to more
than one sense, the first sense is selected as default. In real
scenarios, sense disambiguation tools and domain knowledge
may be used to pick the sense pertaining to each word.

Theorem 3. Y achieved through generalization satisfies kanonymity if and only if ∀y ∈ Y , P (x ⊳ y) ≤ k1 , i.e., the
probability that y is generalized from x is no bigger than k1 .
For generalization based k-anonymization, a set of hypernym trees are generally given. Using these hypernym trees,
t-PAT can anonymize X to Y . If Y is the result of traditional
k-anonymization techniques, then given x, there is only one
y such that x ⊳ y. On the other hand, if Y is the result of
t-PAT, then it is possible that x can be generalized to multiple y’s. According to Theorem 3, this does not violate the
privacy achieved through k-anonymity. Certain extensions
to k-anonymity exist, such as l-diversity [9] among others.
Analysis of how these ideas can be incorporated into text
anonymization and t-PAT is left for future work.

6.2

t-PAT
The ESearch Prune (EP) algorithm, introduced in Section 3.4, performs exhaustive search in the worst case. We
measure how the pruning strategy improves the performance
comparing as compared to the pure exhaustive search algorithm. Figure 3(a) shows the time complexity of EP, where
the x-axis shows different sizes of d varying from 10 to 50,
and the y-axis shows the running time in seconds. The
curves in the figures correspond to different t values from
1024 to 16384. We observe that the running time increases
as the size of d increases because when |d| is large, the search
space is also large. This observation is consistent for all t values. When the size of d is fixed, the running time increases
as t increases since many generalized texts are checked before the pruning condition becomes effective.
In these figures, we do not show the running time of the
pure exhaustive search algorithm because the pure exhaustive search is very inefficient. For |d| = 10, it took about
56 seconds to complete, and for |d| = 20, it took hours. For
any larger |d| values, we were not able to report the running
time within a reasonable amount of time. From Figure 3(a),
we can confirm that pruning strategy is effective.

5.3 From Text to Document
In general, short texts have limited number of sensitive
words. Can we apply the proposed approaches to sanitize a
document? The answer is positive. However, some cautions
are needed. First, since document length varies, choosing a
value for t is difficult if we treat the document as a very large
piece of text. Also, to achieve uniform plausibility with the
same t value for all sensitive words in the document may not
be desirable because the degree of sensitivity may vary from
word to word. A more natural way to sanitize the document
is to break it into text segments. E.g., we can use sentence,
paragraph or section as a unit. Then sensitive words can be
identified and sanitize using various t values.
Identifying sensitive words is a challenging but a separate
problem. There are frameworks that have been proposed
to solve the problem [1, 4, 14, 16]. These techniques are
domain specific, and additional documents may be required
to train the learning algorithms. Also, we can use taggers
(e.g., Brill Tagger [2]) to tag the text to identify the nouns,
since nouns play significant roles in interpreting the meaning
of a natural language. We can treat most nouns as sensitive
words if no other options are available. Moreover, word sense
disambiguation techniques [7] may be needed to effectively
use WordNet because a word can have multiple hypernyms.

6.

6.3 Uniform t-PAT
The time complexity of Uniform ESearch Prune (UEP)
(Figure 3(b)) follows the same trend as EP (α = 0.5). This
validates the proposed pruning strategy. Figure 3(c) reports the time complexity of LUB Search (LUBS) with the
MStep Greedy Search (MSGS) strategy when t = 4096
(other values of t provide identical observation). As expected that when δ increases, more time is required to execute LUBS. When δ = 3, LUBS is still more efficient than
UEP. However, since MSGS does not utilize any pruning
strategy, we do not advocate the use of large δ values. When
LUBS uses One Step Alternative Search (OSAS), the algorithm is as efficient as the case when δ is equal to 0 or 1. We
also measured the time complexity of LUBS with varying t
values. Since the height of each hypernym tree is constant,
t does not affect the running time of LUBS.
Experiments are conducted to analyze the quality of the
proposed heuristics. We first generated optimal solutions
using UEP. Then we executed LUBS with the two greedy
strategies. For MSGS, we run with three δ values from 1 to

EMPIRICAL ANALYSES

In the experimental analysis, we mainly validate the theoretic results presented in the previous sections. As stated in
Section 5.3, we do not intend to directly use our proposed
techniques on sanitizing large documents, and our experimental setting fits this purpose. There are two aspects of
performance of the proposed schemes that we are most interested in: accuracy of the heuristics and the running time.
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Figure 3: Empirical Results
3. The same experiments are run with three t values. Figures 3(d) and 3(e) show the result. All three figures present
similar results: The bottom curves indicate the optimal cost
(the lowest cost). For the MSGS heuristic, the bigger the δ,
the better (or lower) the cost is. This is consistent with our
theoretic reasoning. When δ is large, more possible deviations of d¯ will be searched, so it is more likely to find a better
result. The OSAS heuristic performs really well, and its result is almost as good as the optimal solution. This matches
our intuition that optimal solution is spatially close around
the upper bound d¯ generated at steps 1-3 of Algorithm 3.
As mentioned in Section 4.3, even if MSGS checks more possible deviations of d¯ than OSAS (when δ = 3), it does not
examine spatially close deviations of d¯ as many as OSAS
does. Since we assume words in d are independent, the
OSAS strategy performs better than MSGS. When words
in d are correlated, we expect that MSGS will give better
results. We will verify this in the future.

We have shown that the solution to the t-PAT problem
does not protect individual sensitive word equally. Here we
validate our claims through empirical results. With the same
dataset, first we generate (using the EP algorithm) the optimal solution of t-PAT (Definition 3). We then compare this
optimal solution with the solution produced from UEP and
other heuristics. Figure 3(f) shows the result regarding the
¯ t) (Equation 1). It can be observed that
cost function C(d,
MSGS (δ = 3) performs worse than EP. The main reason
is EP always minimize the first term of the cost function,
and the solution generated from MSGS is not very close to
the optimal. The OSAS greedy strategy outperforms EP
because OSAS produces almost optimal solutions.
Figure 3(g) shows the variance of individual word entropy.
The smaller the variance is, the better the uniform plausibility is achieved. For a smaller text, MSGS achieves better
uniform plausibility. When |d| is large, more spatially close
deviations of d need to be searched for a better solution, but

6.4 Uniform t-PAT vs. t-PAT
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before we had developed the measures an algorithms, as an
example of text that is clearly sensitive (use of an illegal
drug), highly individually identifiable (phantom limb pain
only occurs in amputees), and contains none of the quasiidentifiers listed in the HIPAA safe harbor rules. Defining
marijuana and phantom limb pain as sensitive, and with
α = 0.5 and t = 10, the sentence sanitizes (using all approaches) to “uses soft drug for pain.” This eliminates both
sensitivity and identifiability, while preserving readability
and much of the semantics.
While further evaluation and development is necessary,
we believe that t-PAT provides a valuable supplement to
more traditional text sanitization methods, reducing both
sensitivity and identifiability of items that remain even after
traditional (quasi-)identifiers have been removed.

MSGS fails to do so since δ is fixed to 3. The OSAS strategy achieves almost optimal uniform plausibility. The same
conclusion can be drawn from Figure 3(h) which shows the
maximum entropy of individual words.
We conducted our experiments with different t and α values, and only show some results with two different t values
because the observations do not change with other t values. Regarding other α values (0.25 and 0.75), the variance
analysis remains the same. The MSGS strategy is most affected by δ, and OSAS is extremely close to the optimal,
the α value can only affect its behavior very little, which
depends on the structure of the hypernym trees as well.
Overall, the OSAS strategy works very well. Even though
the MSGS strategy provides moderate improvement over the
upper bound than EP, we expect MSGS will perform better
on correlated dataset, and we will verify this in the future.
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